Foundationalism

Foundationalism is a view concerning the justification structure of our beliefs. While it offers an intuitive approach to the structure of justification in human beliefs, classical foundationalism faces significant challenges that make it difficult to defend in its traditional form. However, I argue that more nuanced, non-classical versions of foundationalism remain defensible.

At its core, foundationalism posits that our justified beliefs are structured hierarchically, with a solid foundation supporting the rest of our belief system. This view distinguishes between two types of justified beliefs: basic (foundational) beliefs and non-basic beliefs. Basic beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification, they are non-inferentially justified, while non-basic beliefs are justified through their inferential relations to other beliefs, ultimately tracing back to basic beliefs.

The primary argument for foundationalism is the epistemic regress argument. This argument contends that for any inferentially justified belief, we must either have an infinite chain of justifications, a circular justification, or terminate at some foundational beliefs. The regress argument relies on a key principle: to be justified in believing a proposition P on the basis of evidence E, one must be (1) justified in believing E, and (2) justified in believing that E makes P probable.

To illustrate this, consider the belief that it's windy outside. To justify this belief, we might appeal to the evidence that trees are swaying. But then we need to justify our belief in this evidence, perhaps by appealing to my belief that I seem to see trees swaying. This chain of inferential justification must either continue infinitely, circle back on itself, or terminate at some foundational belief.

Thus we are facing three options. Infinite chain seems implausible for finite minds, circular reasoning appears viciously self-referential, and thus, foundationalism emerges as an attractive solution by proposing a terminating point in basic beliefs. However, it's crucial to note that the regress argument so far alone doesn't establish foundationalism; it merely demonstrates that if justification is possible, it must take a foundationalist structure. To establish foundationalism, we need the additional premise that epistemic justification is, in principle, possible for beings like us.

Classical foundationalism, as developed by philosophers like Descartes and Locke, holds that basic beliefs must be infallible. The result of it is that most basic beliefs concern the nature of our own sensory states and immediate experiences. For instance, Descartes famously argued in his "Meditations on First Philosophy" that the belief "I am thinking" is indubitable and can serve as a foundation for knowledge. Other examples of basic beliefs in classical foundationalism might include:

"I am experiencing a sensation of redness."

"I am in pain."

"I seem to remember eating breakfast this morning."

These beliefs are considered infallible and self-evident, requiring no further justification. Non-basic beliefs, such as "There is a red apple on the table," would then be justified by their inferential relationship to these basic beliefs.

However, this classical view faces significant challenges. Most notably, it provides too narrow a base upon which to build our knowledge structure. If we limit our basic beliefs to only those concerning our immediate sensory experiences and certain self-evident truths of reason, we end up with very few justified beliefs overall, a conclusion at odds with our intuitive sense of having a broad range of justified beliefs about the world.

In response to these challenges, non-classical forms of foundationalism have emerged. These can be broadly divided into internalist and externalist approaches, each attempting to address the regress problem in distinct ways.

Internalist foundationalism holds that justification must be cognitively accessible to the subject. Michael Huemer's principle of phenomenal conservatism is a prime example of this approach. This principle states that if something seems to be the case and you have no defeaters against that seeming, then you are prima facie justified in accepting it. The key idea here is that seemings - the way things appear to us in conscious experience - can serve as a source of justification for foundational beliefs.

For instance, if it seems to you that you're reading this essay right now, and you have no reason to doubt this seeming (e.g., no reasons to think you are dreaming or hallucinating), then you're justified in believing that you're reading this essay. Phenomenal conservatism is attractive because it aligns with our intuitive sense of how we form many of our beliefs, and it provides a broad foundation for knowledge without requiring infallibility or certainty.

However, Huemer's phenomenal conservatism faces several significant challenges. Firstly, it may be overly permissive. If we accept beliefs simply because they seem true to us, we risk endorsing a host of unjustified or even harmful beliefs. Consider, for instance, how this principle might justify holding racist or sexist beliefs if they simply "seem" true to someone.

However, Huemer would likely respond that seemings are not just fleeting or arbitrary appearances. In phenomenal conservatism, a seeming is a cognitive state that presents a proposition as true in a way that provides prima facie justification for belief. He could argue that such seemings are typically reliable, especially when concerning straightforward matters like perceptual experiences, memory, or introspection. The fact that something seems true to a person gives it an initial, defeasible justification.

Additionally, critics argue that phenomenal conservatism doesn't truly solve the regress problem, but merely pushes it back a step. Instead of asking what justifies our beliefs, we now must ask what justifies our reliance on seemings. This threatens to recreate the very infinite regress that foundationalism sought to avoid.

On the other hand, externalist foundationalism argues that factors external to the subject's mental states can provide justification. Alvin Goldman's reliabilism is a prime example of this approach. This view argues that a belief is justified if it results from a reliable cognitive process – that is, a process that tends to produce true beliefs rather than false ones. For example, under this view, the belief "There is a cat on the mat" could be justified if it results from visual perception, which is generally a reliable process for forming beliefs about medium-sized objects in our immediate environment.

Goldman's reliabilism, while addressing some issues of classical foundationalism, introduces new challenges. The core problem is the difficulty in determining the reliability of our belief-forming processes without circularity. How can we know that our cognitive faculties are reliable without already relying on those very faculties?

What Goldman could say in response is that all that matters for the justification of the given belief is that that very belief is the result of the reliable process. A process that produce that belief is either reliable or it's not. Our belief whether it is reliable or not is not relevant either for the fact that it is or is not reliable or for the fact whether the target belief is justified or not. Goldman might concede that there may no non-circular way of justifying the belief that the processes are reliable. Still this would be a problem for a meta/second order belief and not the target belief. This perspective is missing the value of justification that we theoretically have in our mind.

Both internalist and externalist approaches aim to solve the regress problem, but in different ways. Internalist theories like phenomenal conservatism stop the regress at conscious seemings, while externalist theories like reliabilism terminate it in unconscious, reliable processes. The internalist approach provides a clearer account of how justification relates to our conscious experience, while the externalist view offers a more naturalistic explanation that aligns well with cognitive science.

It's important to acknowledge that foundationalism is not without alternatives. Coherentism, as developed by philosophers like Laurence BonJour, rejects the presupposition that all justification is linear or one-directional. Instead, it posits that beliefs are justified "holistically" by virtue of belonging to a coherent set of beliefs. For example, our belief that "The Earth is roughly spherical" is ultimately justified not by foundational beliefs, but by its coherence with a vast network of beliefs about astronomy, physics, geography, and our everyday experiences.

Critics of modern foundationalism might argue that broadening the base of basic beliefs, as in phenomenal conservatism, risks admitting too much and losing the rigorous foundation that foundationalism initially sought to provide. They might contend that this makes these theories indistinguishable from coherentism in practice.

In response, I would argue that these modern forms of foundationalism still maintain a crucial distinction from coherentism: they posit that some beliefs have a privileged epistemic status, not derived from their relations to other beliefs. While this base is broader than in classical foundationalism, it still provides a starting point for the structure of justification that coherentism lacks.

In conclusion, foundationalism offers a compelling solution to the problem of justification by proposing that our beliefs are built upon basic, non-inferentially justified beliefs. While classical foundationalism's requirement for infallible basic beliefs proves too restrictive, non-classical versions of foundationalism present more defensible approaches to the structure of epistemic justification.

Both internalist approaches like phenomenal conservatism and externalist theories like reliabilism demonstrate how foundationalism can be adapted to address traditional criticisms while maintaining its core insight: that some beliefs must have a privileged epistemic status independent of their relations to other beliefs. This distinguishes foundationalism from alternatives like coherentism and provides a more coherent account of how our justified beliefs are structured.

These non-classical approaches seem plausible in defending the fundamental foundationalist thesis about the structure of justification while avoiding the pitfalls of classical foundationalism's infallibilism. By maintaining this crucial distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs while broadening our understanding of what can count as foundational, modern foundationalism remains a theoretically defensible position in epistemology.